Posted by bert hubert Wed, 09 Jul 2008 19:31:00 GMT
Yesterday it was announced that there is an unspecified but major DNS vulnerability, and that Microsoft, Nominum and ISC had fixes available.
It is amusing to note that this has been hailed as a major feat of cooperation, with the vulnerable parties spinned as being part of secret industry cabal that has just saved the world from very bad things.
To say the least, I find this a funny way of presenting things! The vulnerability is still not public, but the secret cabal shared it with me. Perhaps it is fair to say I am part of the cabal - I nearly traveled to the secret meeting at the Microsoft campus, but the imminent birth of my son made me decide not to go.
The DNS vulnerability that has been presented yesterday is indeed a very serious problem, and I am glad steps are now taken to fix the broken software that was vulnerable. Dan Kaminksy is to be praised for discovering the issue and coordinating the release.
However - the parties involved aren’t to be lauded for their current fix. Far from it. It has been known since 1999 that all nameserver implementations were vulnerable for issues like the one we are facing now. In 1999, Dan J. Bernstein released his nameserver (djbdns), which already contained the countermeasures being rushed into service now. Let me repeat this. Wise people already saw this one coming 9 years ago, and had a fix in place.
In 2006 when my own resolving nameserver entered the scene, I decided to use the same security strategy as implemented in djbdns (it is always better to steal a great idea than to think up a mediocre one!). Some time after that, I realised none of the other nameservers had chosen to do so, and I embarked on an effort to move the IETF DNS-EXT working group to standardise and thus mandate this high security behaviour.
This didn’t really go anywhere, but some months ago I noticed particularly strenuous resistance in the standardisation of the so called ‘forgery resilience draft’, and after some prodding it became clear it was felt my draft was in danger of drawing attention to the then unannounced DNS vulnerability, and that it were best if we’d all shut up about it for a few months, perhaps until July 2008 until all the vendors would have had time to get their act together.
And now we’ve seen the release, and it is being hailed as great news. But it isn’t. Dan Bernstein has been ignored since 1999 when he said something should be done. I’ve been ignored since 2006. The IETF standardisation languished for two years.
This is not a success story. It has in fact been a remarkable failure.
To end on a positive note - I am very glad Dan Kaminsky’s work caused some collective eye opening, and I hope good things come from this. DNS has long lacked critical attention, and in the end this might bring about sorely needed improvements.
DNS very recently celebrated its 25th birthday - I look forward to seeing the venerable Domain Name System succeed in the coming 25 years!